Abstract: In the landmark 2005 Kelo case, the Supreme Court ruled that eminent domain takings for private development constituted permissible "public use" because of their potential to produce higher revenue. This paper provides the first examination of that relationship between eminent domain activity and state and local revenue. We find virtually no evidence of a positive relationship between the number of eminent domain takings for private use (such as the one that led to the Kelo decision) and the level of revenue. We find some limited evidence of a negative relationship between eminent domain and future revenue growth.
Introduction
The United States Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London 1 in 2005 sparked outrage around the country. In this decision, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed the use of eminent domain to transfer property in New London, Connecticut, for private benefit, not for public use as set forth in the takings clause of the U.S. Constitution. This case focused the attention of citizens, politicians, and academics on property takings. The general public expressed concern that homes, churches, or other properties can now be expropriated on the grounds that redevelopment could decrease unemployment and increase government tax revenue.
Many regarded the Kelo decision as an abuse of government power and a threat to liberty (Benson, 2010; Cohen, 2006; . Politicians scurried to reassure troubled voters by examining, and in some cases modifying, state constitutional constraints on the use of eminent domain. Eventually almost every state implemented some sort of restriction. Policy analysts and academics published articles that chronicled eminent domain abuse (Berliner, 2006) , scrutinized state takings for private benefit (Kerekes, 2011; Lanza et al., 2013) , and analyzed state reforms in the wake of the Kelo decision (Lopez et al., 2009; Lopez and Totah, 2007; Sandefur 2006a; Somin, 2007 Somin, , 2009 ).
This paper is an extension of a study that emerged from this literature. Turnbull and Salvino (2009) were the first to empirically examine the relationship between eminent domain for private benefit and the size of state and local public sectors. The purpose of their paper was to test the Leviathan hypothesis proposed by Brennan and Buchanan (1980) . This argument states that broader eminent domain powers (i.e., allowing governments to use eminent domain for redevelopment in order to increase employment or to increase the tax base) provide state and local governments additional means through which to increase their overall size. In effect, the 2005 decision in Kelo weakened a constitutional constraint on government size. As a result, state and local public sectors may increase in size.
We utilize the Turnbull and Salvino (2009) model and extend it to investigate the effects of eminent domain from a different angle. The Kelo ruling allows the compulsory transfer of property between individuals based on the claim that eminent domain used for redevelopment results in increases in the tax base that, in turn, convey public benefits. Our question is whether such applications of eminent domain will actually increase revenue. As we discuss below, if more expansive eminent domain powers undermine the security of private property rights, eminent domain for private benefit may cause the tax base to shrink as a result of decreases in private investment. Given the significant potential negative consequences that arise when government undermines property rights, it is worth investigating whether eminent domain for development purposes actually generates the additional government revenue it is purported to create. Turnbull and Salvino (2009) find that having the power to use eminent domain for economic development (as local governments in seven states did) is associated with greater government revenue. We build on their work by using a more precise measure of eminent domain (actual eminent domain activity rather than a binary variable for potential power), a newer dataset, more control variables, and a variable for revenue growth (in addition to level). We find virtually no evidence of a statistically significant positive relationship between eminent domain and the level of state and local tax revenue. We find limited evidence of a statistically significant negative relationship between eminent domain and the future growth of state and local tax revenue. Our failure to find a positive relationship between eminent domain activity and tax revenues suggests that eminent domain for redevelopment fails to achieve its intended purpose. Our paper supports arguments for constraints that limit property takings for private gain.
The next section presents the motivation for the paper, including a brief discussion of the general role of property rights. Section 3 details the empirical model and data. Section 4 provides the econometric results and Section 5 concludes.
Background and motivation
There is little debate that property rights are a vital component of a market economy. The institution of well-defined, secure private property rights is the foundation of voluntary exchange. Property rights provide incentives for individuals to maintain property, seek opportunities for mutually beneficial trade, and be innovative and entrepreneurial. Property rights are requisite to coordinate the actions of market participants and generate economic development (Hayek, 1945 (Hayek, , 1960 von Mises, 1935) . The link between secure property rights and economic growth is well established in the literature on economic development (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2001 Acemoglu et al., , 2002 Boettke, 1994; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Landau, 2003; Leblang, 1996; Mauro, 1995) .
When property rights become less secure, individuals are less able to reap the benefits of a market economy. Individuals are less likely to undertake capital investments as the threat of expropriation of property and physical assets increases (Besley, 1995; de Soto, 1989 de Soto, , 2000 Kerekes and Williamson, 2008) . As incentives for capital accumulation decrease, so too do incentives for productive entrepreneurship and innovation (Boettke and Coyne, 2003; Boettke et al., 2010) . Consequently, encroachments on individual property rights -such as eminent domain activity -undermine economic growth.
While the importance of property rights is not controversial, the use of eminent domain to acquire property is. The United States government derives its authority to confiscate private property from the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution. While the original intent of the takings clause was that property only be taken for public use and with just compensation, the interpretation of this clause has changed over time.
2 Eminent domain has been used to take property for public purpose and, increasingly, for private 2 For a more detailed discussion of how the interpretation of the takings clause has changed over time, see Epstein (1985) , Greenhut (2004), and Sandefur (2006b) .
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benefit. The traditional interpretation of public use includes taking private property for the provision of public facilities and infrastructure, such as railroads, highways, or schools. In such instances, eminent domain may be used to combat the holdout problem and to reduce the transactions costs associated with acquiring property for public facilities and infrastructure. Epstein (1985) provides a comprehensive study of the takings clause and the use of eminent domain in the United States. The evolution of the utilization of eminent domain for public use to public purpose and, ultimately, to private benefit, stems from a series of court cases. Some of the more important cases include Berman v. In Kelo v. City of New London, residential property was acquired by eminent domain for the purpose of redevelopment. The city's redevelopment plan included a hotel and shopping center and research, office, and retail space to accompany a new facility for the pharmaceutical company Pfizer. The city of New London argued that the redevelopment plan fulfilled the public purpose interpretation of the takings clause because redevelopment would increase employment and increase the tax base.
6 Kelo relaxed the constraints on the use of eminent domain and implied that eminent domain can now be used to transfer private property from one private party to another for private benefit. Some claim, and the US Supreme Court concurred, that eminent domain for private development purposes can promote economic growth (Ranis, 2007 ("This case is of vital importance to amici, whose members include state and local governments and officials throughout the United States. These officials use eminent domain for many purposes, including as a fundamental tool for economic development in distressed cities like New London. Eminent domain is often indispensable for revitalizing local economies, creating much-needed jobs, and generating revenue that enables cities to provide essential services."). 7 "Much has been made recently of Kelo and the negative impact of eminent domain in its use of state and municipal powers to transfer property rights from individual homeowners in poorer, marginal neighbourhoods… to larger private property enterprises that will achieve simply larger tax revenues. Most eminent domain initiatives are not used to condemn momand-pop groceries or small homes for the sake of replacing them with larger operated businesses but rather for large urban, community mixed public and private complexes that provide increased employment, an enhanced tax base, urban development, and community edification" (Ranis, 2007:195-196) . "Critical to the impact of Kelo is that it was decided by the Supreme The argument is that areas that undergo redevelopment experience increases in employment, home ownership, property values, and tax revenues. However, Carpenter and Ross (2008) examine the effects of state reforms restricting eminent domain following the Kelo decision on construction jobs, building permits, and property tax revenues. They find no evidence that limiting eminent domain for private use negatively affects these variables. Turnbull et al. (2013) examine the relationship between eminent domain and private-sector employment growth. Their findings indicate that the power to use eminent domain for economic development does not increase private-sector employment; in fact, it may actually be associated with slower employment growth.
The use of eminent domain to seize property for private benefit received significant attention following Kelo in 2005. Berliner (2003) estimates there were more than 10,282 filed or threatened condemnations for private use or benefit in the years 1998 through 2002 (or about 2,000 per year across those five years). In the year following the Kelo decision (June 2005 to June 2006), Berliner (2006) estimates 5,783 properties were condemned or threatened with the use of eminent domain to benefit other private parties, nearly three times more per year than had occurred in the 1998-2002 period.
The data and empirical model
Proponents of eminent domain typically argue that it will provide a benefit to the public by increasing tax revenue (which presumably will be used in a way that residents value). This argument supplies two testable hypotheses: H1: Eminent domain activity is positively associated with subsequent revenue levels. H2: Eminent domain activity is positively associated with subsequent revenue growth.
Using data for 1990 and 2000, Turnbull and Salvino (2009) find that eminent domain for private benefit is associated with higher levels of tax revenue and own-source revenue as a percentage of personal income. Their measure of eminent domain is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for states that explicitly empower local governments to use eminent domain for private Court on behalf of providing jobs for workers in a depressed area, resurrecting the New London Community, and the important principle of preserving and creating employment and a viable tax base" (p. 203). Note that the Berliner data understate the total amount of eminent domain activity as they exclude those activities done for traditional public purposes (schools, roads, etc.) . In a later report, Berliner (2006) 
Then, to expand on Turnbull and Salvino's work, we enhance their model in a variety of ways. Instead of using their raw count of the number of local governments to measure fragmentation, 13 we use the number per 100,000 residents to provide more meaningful comparisons across states with widely differing numbers of residents. We also employ traditional regional dummy variables rather than their dummy variable for "former Confederate states or border states."
14
In addition, we add three control variables to account for differences in demographics and economic conditions that can affect government revenues: the percentage of population aged 18-64, the unemployment rate, and the real per capita gross domestic product. With few exceptions where data were unavailable, our data for each of these control variables are for 2004 and 2008 (which are the two years for which we examine revenue levels and the first year of our two growth periods). The level and growth of revenue (our dependent variables) may have an impact on eminent domain activity (our independent variable of interest). For example, governments in states with low or slow-growing revenue may be more likely to utilize eminent domain in order to increase their revenue. We first address this potential endogeneity problem by including a control variable for the lagged growth of revenue. To capture the revenue growth trend in each state, we use 1995-1998 and 2002-2005 , the three-year periods before the first year of our eminent domain activity data for each of the two periods available (1998 -2002 and June 2005 -June 2006 . As Table A1 indicates, there is no statistically significant correlation between that lagged revenue growth and subsequent eminent domain activity. Our expanded models are (2) Revenue i,t ¼ α þ β 1 Eminent domain activity i,t−2 þ β 2 Revenue decentralization i,t þ β 3 Local governments per 100,000 residents i,t−2 þ β 4-Control variables i,t þ β 5 Lagged revenue growth i,t .
(3) Revenue Growth i,t ¼ α þ β 1 Eminent domain activity i,t−2 þ β 2 Revenue decentralization i,t þ β 3 Local governments per 100,000 residents i,t−2 þ β 4 Control variables i, t þ β 5 Lagged revenue growth i,t .
In addition, following Turnbull and Salvino, as an alternative way to address the potential endogeneity problem, we later drop the lagged revenue growth variable and instead make use of three instrumental variables for our eminent domain variables: lawyers per 1,000 population, percentage of land owned by the state government, and income skewness. As Turnbull and Salvino (2009) suggest, having a higher number of lawyers implies that residents are more likely to resort to nonmarket solutions to disputes; having a higher percentage of land owned by the state implies a greater willingness on the part of government to get involved in land markets; and income skewness "is included to capture possible income distribution effects on choice of institutional restrictions on local powers" (p. 801). Data sources are provided in Table A2 . Summary statistics can be found in Table A3 . Correlation coefficients for our three main eminent domain variables and our four main dependent variables are found in Table A4 .
Regression results
We first attempt to replicate the results of Turnbull and Salvino (2009) 2004-2007 and 2008-2011. 15 In the interest of brevity, we have only included results using combined state and local revenue for our dependent variable. We found similar results when we used state revenue and local revenue separately. Those results are available in a previous working paper version of this paper. Table 2 shows our results for the combined state and local tax and revenue data, using Turnbull and Salvino's binary variable for eminent domain power. As they did, we find evidence of a statistically significant positive relationship between eminent domain power and the level of state and local taxes and revenue as a 
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Replication of Turnbull and Salvino (2009)
Eminent domain power binary variable
Local intergovernmental revenue from state government, as % of state total expenditure
Urban share of population
Confederate state dummy
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All models include year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
percentage of personal income. 16 So we are able to replicate their results with a newer data set. Next we change how eminent domain is measured. Instead of the binary variable, we use total condemnations for private purposes. Otherwise, all the other variables are the same. As Table 3 shows, using this improved measure, we fail to find any statistically significant relationship between eminent domain activity and revenue levels. (That result holds true when revenue is measured on a per capita basis as well.) While the relationships are not significant, we do still find positive coefficients for our more precise measure of eminent domain activity. However, the explanatory power of our models, as indicated by the R-squared statistic, is slightly lower when we use this more precise measure.
Using the same model, Table 4 shows the results when we measure eminent domain activity as total condemnations per housing unit. Here too we fail to find any statistically significant relationship between eminent domain activity and revenue levels. (That result holds true when revenue is measured on a per capita basis as well.) As with the previous set of results, the explanatory power of our models is slightly lower than with the binary variable for eminent domain. Table 5 shows the results when we measure eminent domain activity as total condemnations per capita. Otherwise, all the other variables remain the same. Once again, we find no evidence of a statistically significant relationship between eminent domain activity and the level of state and local tax revenue. (That result holds true when revenue is measured on a per capita basis as well.)
As Table 2 shows, we confirm the findings of Turnbull and Salvino (2009) of a statistically significant positive relationship between their binary measure of eminent domain power and the level of state and local government revenue. Our results show that their findings are robust to a newer dataset. However, using three different, more precise measures of eminent domain, we fail to find evidence of a statistically significant relationship between eminent domain activity and the level of state and local government revenue. In addition, we find that the explanatory power of our models (measured by the value for R-squared) is lower when we use our more precise measure of eminent domain activity than when we use the Turnbull-Salvino binary variable, which provides further support for the idea that there is no relationship between eminent domain and the level of state and local government revenue when eminent 16 When the revenue variables are measured on a per capita basis, the coefficient on the eminent domain power variable is also statistically significant (and positive) in all four of the models. For brevity, those results are not included. They are available from the authors upon request. domain is measured more precisely. These results are robust to changes in how revenue is measured (own-source general revenue or tax revenue), and we find similar results (not reported herein) when we measure revenue on a per capita basis instead of as a percentage of personal income. 
Total eminent domain condemnations
Median household income (current dollars)
Notes:* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All models include year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
New model
Next, we modify some of the control variables in the Turnbull and Salvino (2009) model and add four new control variables as well as a new dependent variable for revenue growth. To measure fragmentation, we use the number of local 19 We also add three variables to control for differences in demographics and economic conditions: the percentage of population aged 18-64, the unemployment rate, and the per capita GDP.
In the interest of brevity, we drop the total eminent domain condemnations variable, and we use only one variable for decentralization rather than two. Since the states vary widely in their population and number of housing units, adjusting the total condemnations data for those two factors provides a more meaningful comparison across states, so we focus hereafter on the per housing unit and per capita measures. The two decentralization variables are highly correlated (with a correlation coefficient of 0.767). Also, they are used independently in separate regressions, and there are not substantial differences in the results for the eminent domain variables in those two sets of results (see Tables 2-5 ). We choose to keep the revenue decentralization variable (local own-source general revenue as a percentage of state and local own-source general revenue) and drop expenditure decentralization because our focus is on revenue.
Finally, because there may be a simultaneous relationship between revenue growth and eminent domain (low or slow-growing revenue may lead states to increase eminent domain activity), we add a control variable for lagged revenue growth. We use revenue growth over the periods 1995-1998 and 2002-2005 , the three-year periods preceding the first year of our eminent domain activity data for each period (1998 -2002 and June 2005 -June 2006 . Table 6 shows the results for the level of combined state and local tax and revenue for all three measures of eminent domain (the binary variable and our two eminent domain activity variables) when utilizing our revised model. The statistical significance (and the size) of the coefficients on the eminent domain variables remain roughly the same as with the replications in the previous section (Tables 2-5 ). The two more precise measures have statistically insignificant coefficients, and the binary variable continues to have a statistically 18 For example, Florida had 1,623 local governments in 2007, nearly two and a half times West Virginia's 663. By that measure, Florida has substantially greater fragmentation. But Florida has 10 times as many people as West Virginia, so when you adjust for population, Florida is actually substantially less fragmented, not more -8.8 governments per 100,000 people compared to 36.1 in West Virginia. 19 The excluded variable is Northeast. Takings and Tax Revenue significant coefficient and positive sign. Our revised model also consistently provides greater explanatory power. If eminent domain activity has a long-lasting impact on revenue, then we should expect to see a positive relationship with future revenue growth. Table 7 shows the results for the growth of combined state and local tax and revenue over the periods 2004-2007 and 2008-2011 (starting two years after the last year of our data for eminent domain activity) for all three measures of eminent domain. 20 All four of the regressions using our more precise measures for eminent domain show negative coefficients, two of those are statistically significant (the two for the broader measure of general revenue from own sources). A one standard deviation change in eminent domain activity is associated with a decline in the three-year growth rate of state and local own-source general revenue (as a percentage of income) of about 0.74 to 0.77 percentage points. The binary variable for eminent domain power is positive but statistically insignificant both times. In all six models, we fail to find a statistically significant positive relationship between eminent domain and subsequent revenue growth. The explanatory power of these six models is higher than those for the level of revenue in the previous set of results.
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In our effort to closely replicate the approach of Turnbull and Salvino (2009), we confirm their findings of a positive relationship between their binary variable for eminent domain power and the level of state and local government revenue with a newer dataset. However, those findings are not robust to the usage of more precise measures of eminent domain. Using those new measures, we find no evidence of a statistically significant relationship between eminent domain activity and the level of state and local tax revenue, and thus fail to find support for the hypothesis (H1) that eminent domain activity is positively associated with the subsequent level of tax revenue. We also find no evidence in favor of hypothesis (H2) that eminent domain activity is positively associated with subsequent state and local government revenue growth are mixed. The binary variable is statistically insignificant in both regressions, and in all four regressions our new eminent domain activity measures are negative, in two cases those coefficients are statistically significant. So, we find some evidence of a negative relationship with future revenue growth.
20 As of October 2014, fiscal year 2011 was the most recent year available for combined state and local government finances. With our chosen two-year lag in revenue effects, this limited us to a three-year revenue growth period. In a previous version of this paper, we used a four-year growth period with the 1998-2002 eminent domain data (Berliner, 2003) as a single cross section and found similar results. Table 7 : Three-year growth of combined state and local taxes and revenue, using all three eminent domain variables. 
Variables
Takings and Tax Revenue 
Urban share of population 
West region dummy variable 
Instrumental variables
Our dependent variables (the level and growth of revenue) may have an impact on our independent variable of interest, eminent domain activity. That is, states with lower revenue or lower revenue growth may be more likely to engage in eminent domain activity in an effort to increase revenue. In the previous analysis, we attempted to address that potential endogeneity problem by including a control variable for the lagged growth of our dependent variable (revenue). An alternative approach is to find instrumental variables that are correlated with our eminent domain variables but that do not have the same potential reverse causality relationship with our dependent variables. Such variables are inevitably very difficult to identify, and results using this approach should be interpreted with caution. As discussed in the previous section, Turnbull and Salvino made use of three instrumental variables: lawyers per 1,000 population, percentage of land owned by the state government, and income skewness. We use those same three variables in this section. Table 8 shows our results from replicating the Turnbull-Salvino model. For brevity, we do not include the binary variable for eminent domain power. As in Table 2 , the coefficients for that variable are statistically significant and positive, though they are about two to three times larger in magnitude, confirming the results of Turnbull-Salvino with our newer dataset. 21 Similarly, the results for our two new eminent domain activity variables do not change much compared to Tables 4 and 5 . The (positive) magnitudes of the coefficients are larger, but they are still statistically insignificant. Using our expanded model, Table 9 shows that the binary variable for eminent domain power continues to have positive and statistically significant coefficients (as it did in Table 6 ). Results for the new eminent domain variables are also similar to the previous results. There are positive coefficients for all four regressions, but for the broader measure of general revenue from own sources, they are not statistically significant. For the narrower measure of tax revenue, they are statistically significant, but weakly so (only at the 10% level). Table 10 shows that our two eminent domain variables have no statistically significant relationship with the growth of taxes and revenue. This is in contrast to the previous OLS results in Table 7 in which two of the four regressions showed a statistically significant negative relationship with growth. Neither of the two regressions using the binary variable for eminent domain power showed a statistically significant relationship either.
When we use instrumental variables, our results continue to confirm the findings of Turnbull and Salvino for revenue levels and their binary measure of eminent domain power (see Table 9 ). For our two more precise measures of eminent domain activity, the use of instrumental variables changes our results 
Variables
State and local general revenue from own sources (% of personal income)
State and local tax revenue (% of personal income)
Eminent domain condemnations per housing unit
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. † With 2SLS, Stata does not report a value for R-squared when it is negative.All models include year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Eminent domain is treated as endogenous in all models.
Takings and Tax Revenue Table 9 : Levels of combined state and local taxes and revenue, using instrumental variables and new eminent domain variables. 
Percentage of population aged Takings and Tax Revenue slightly. Two of the four results show a weakly statistically significant (at the 10% level) positive coefficient for eminent domain; both of which are for the narrower measure of tax revenue (see Table 9 ), compared to none of the four in the previous results (Table 6 ). However, with the broader measure of general revenue from own sources, the results using our instrumental variables confirm those previous results, finding no statistically significant relationship between eminent domain activity and the level of government revenue. Thus, our first hypothesis (H1) -that eminent domain activity is positively associated with the subsequent level of state and local government revenue -is provided only weak support. For our measure of revenue growth when we use instrumental variables, the results change somewhat. The coefficients on the binary variable for eminent domain power are again statistically insignificant. For our more precise measure, none of the four regressions (in Table 10 ) show a statistically significant relationship between eminent domain activity and the growth of government revenue. That compares to two of the four showing significance in Table 7 (both negative). Therefore, we again fail to find support for our second hypothesis (H2) -that eminent domain activity is positively associated with subsequent state and local government revenue growth.
Overall, we largely confirm the previous findings of Turnbull and Salvino (2009) that there is a positive relationship between their binary measure of eminent domain power and the level of state and local government revenue using an entirely different, and newer, dataset. However, when eminent domain is measured more precisely, we fail to find much evidence to support that finding. Our findings are robust across a wide variety of specifications (only two out of 24 coefficients are supportive of a positive relationship with revenue levels), including modifications in the measurement of eminent domain, changes in the measure of revenue, as well as refinements in the way fragmentation and regional location are measured.
When we expand further on the work of Turnbull and Salvino by examining subsequent revenue growth, we fail to find evidence that supports the hypothesis that eminent domain is positively associated with future revenue growth. To the contrary, using our more precise measure of eminent domain activity, we find some limited evidence of a negative relationship between eminent domain and revenue growth (two out of eight regressions find a statistically significant negative coefficient).
While our results are somewhat inconclusive, taken as a whole, they cast doubt on the argument commonly made for individual eminent domain activities -that they will increase government revenue in the future. These findings are relevant for contemporary public policy debates concerning the use of eminent domain. Ultimately, the redevelopment plans that culminated in the 2005 Kelo decision did not materialize; the property at the center of this landmark Supreme Court case sits vacant (Allen, 2014; McGeehan, 2009) . Failed fundraising attempts and a lack of financing derailed components of the initial development plan. Given the controversy surrounding the Kelo decision and the potential implications for long-run economic growth, further investigation of the revenue implications of eminent domain for private benefit should be beneficial. Almost no empirical research has been produced on the relationship between eminent domain and government revenue. We build on the one previous study (Turnbull and Salvino, 2009 ) by using a more precise measure of eminent domain (actual activity rather than potential power), a newer dataset, more control variables, and we include an additional set of dependent variables (for revenue growth). Ultimately, we find virtually no evidence of a statistically significant positive relationship between eminent domain and the subsequent level of state and local tax revenue. In contrast, we find some limited evidence of a statistically significant negative relationship between eminent domain and the subsequent growth of state and local tax revenue. These results are robust across a variety of specifications.
Our results contradict one of the primary arguments often made by politicians in favor of eminent domain activity -that it will increase revenue. One possible explanation for that contradiction is that economic impact studies of new local developments are often plagued by double counting and the omission of opportunity costs. As a result, the subsequent impact on the local economy, and therefore on government revenue, is often much lower than anticipated. While much further work is needed in this area, one implication of our results is that voters ought to be much more skeptical about politicians' and developers' claims regarding the revenue impact of eminent domain activity for private purposes. 
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